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Id.-Appeal-Objections-Conduct of Counsel.-Where certain letters which were writter1 defendant
his wife were
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represented defendant
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in questioning defendant concerning other letters which had
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at time
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knowledge" that
prompted him to
defendant to such cross-examination.
[12] Id.- Conduct of CounseL-Prosecuting
was not
guilty of questioning
of defendant in
that "if
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it up, I'm going to have to take the
stand," where such statement was made after
attorney had
defendant
size of book with
which defendant stated his wife had struck his son and defendant, who refused to answer, did not understand what was
expected of him, and that by quoted words prosecuting attorney meant that he would have to take the stand to testify
as to size of hook.
[13] Id.-Appeal- Harmless Error- Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-Defendant in uxoricide case was not prejudiced by
alleged misconduct of prosecuting attorney in asking de-
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case that witness went to sheriff's officce when
ahout victim's death may not
on
of misconduct was made in trial
in any event, such matter was immaterial
fendant's
or mnocence.
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death
fatal

sustains conviction
in uxoricide case,
defendant did not fire
where it shows that crime was result of
over
of time on

APPEAL
taken under Pen.
§ 1239)
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County
and from au order
a new triaL B.
Hawkins,
,Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder.
death
affirmed.

of conviction imposing

Doris II. Maier and
for Re-

Edmund G.
Prederick G.

and
indictment with the murder
"'""~··~vu on
about March
1953. Clarence
13 years of age, was certified to the
against him suspended. Defendant
pleaded not
and not guilty by reason of insanity. After
a jury trial, he vvas found guilty of murder in the first degree
without recommendation; he was also found sane at the time
the crime was committed. Defendant's motion for a new trial
on both pleas was denied. The appeal is automatic (Pen. Code,
§ 1239, subd. b).
The
of the prosecution, in essence, was that Henry
Simpson counseled, advised, and encouraged (Pen. Code, § 31)
his 13-year-old son, Clarence Simpson, to kill Vivian Simpson,
the wife of Henry and mother of Clarence ; that such crime
was the result of premeditation and planning over a period
of time on the part of Henry, Clarence, and a 14-year-old
school friend of Clarence, one Jimmie Jones. Defendant and
Clarence both
the planning and premeditation, although
Clarence admits aiming the gun at his mother and killing her
with one shot through the chest. It is the main contention
of the defendant that the testimony of Jimmie Jones, being
an accomplice, is uncorroborated. Defendant denied that
there was a plan made with Clarence and Jimmie to kill Vivian
and claimed that Jimmie told him the gun went off when Clarence stumbled over a stake.
BACKGROUND

Henry Simpson and Vivian Dodge met in 1937, or 1938, in
Porterville, California, and shortly thereafter commenced living together. Both parties had been previously married and
Vivian had an infant son, Donald Dodge, living with her.
In 1939, Clarence was born and in 1942, the couple were
married. Two other sons, Billy and Gary, were subsequently
born to them. The Simpsons moved several times selling, at
different times, grocery stores, an auto court, and a poultry
ranch until 1952 when Henry traded a ranch near Escalon
for a home at 1117 Herndon Road, in Stanislaus County.
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. The
and the evidence shows numerous
of both. Defendant testifird that Vivian
was "No
" and "whore"; that she had sexnal relations
\Yith other men; that she beat and threatened the children.
A i one time Vivian had defendant arrested for
her with a
>veapon at which time she left him for several weeks; at another
defendant commenced a divorce
action
Vh·ian but
dismissed it. At still
another time, defendant had a warrant issued for Vivian's
arrest because she had been beating the children; a witness
testified, ho\vever, that the action was taken to "
even with
her" for haYing had him arrested. About this time, defendant commenced another divorce action and the children were
placed in the custody of the juvenile court. Both the criminal
adion ancl the diYorce snit against Vivian were dismissed
and the children were returned to the couple who started livtogether again.
Sueh was the background to the events which culminated
in the shooting of Vivian on March 10, 1953.
TESTDIONY m' Jnnrm JoNES

,Jimmie Jones testified that on Friday afternoon, 1\Iarch 6,
J 953,
defendant, and Clarenee were at the Holm A venue
house whieh <lefendant was engaged in remodeling. ,Jimmie
testified that defendant told him he wanted him, ,Jimmie, to
be a witness for him and Clarence-that they were going to
]\ill ViYian. Aceording to Jimmie's story, it was :first suggested that Clarence use a baseball bat to kill his mother
and then put a knife in her hand to make it look like selfdefense. 'l'his plan ·was rejected by the boys. It was then
sugge~o;ted that a fishing trip be planned for a week from the
following Saturday; that the boys bring a rifle into the house,
pretend to be cleaning it, and that Clarence would '' accidentally" shoot his mother. Jimmie testified that he spent most

based On an aCCUSation auc;,.;c;u"L.Y
he and Clarence had stolen a watch
and some money from the Curtis home where she worked
when
had been there
to
her home in the
car driven
defendant.) Jimmie testified that defendant
had told them that
committed the
would
but "to leave him out of it so he could get
us a
and after it was over he would get us a car and
a gun and we would go on a
that summer and have a lot
of fun and everything'' ; for them to stick to their
(of
an accidental shooting) and that ''after it was over and we
stuck to our
and everything came out all
he would
us a ear, a gun, and going to take us on a trip that
summer, back to Arizona and Nevada, or some place back
there . . . . We were going to have a lot of fun fishing and
stuff, and catch horses. . . . Yes, wild horses, and bring them
out here.'' He also testified ''. . . he told us when we went
on a fishing
to bring the gun in the living room and
kind of wrastle around over it and we would accidentally shoot
Mrs. Simpson. That was to be done on the following Saturday.''
Jimmie testified that on Monday, March 9, he and Clarence,
at defendant's
took the gun out of the house and
across the
and put it in between the rafters and wall of
a house which was being built by a man by the name of ''Bill''
(later identified as one Bill
to hide it; that later
that night he and Clarence got the gun from its hiding place
and put it in defendant's truck.
Concerning the day of the
Jimmie testified that
after school, about 4 o
he and Clarence went to the
Simpson home and did the chores; that they went to the Holm
A venue house where defendant was working and that defendant again repeated the plan to them. After supper, the boys
rode their bicycles to Roy Lutz' house to see if Mrs. Simpson
was there; that after returning from there they "went in the
house and went in and laid clown on the boys' bed and were
reading books of some sort when the smallest boy, Gary, came
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in and told Clarence and I that Mrs.
papers that
to Mr.
or someand Clarence walked over to her bedroom and
the curtains hack and
with it.
She said that she was
them
that
beboth her and Mr.
that both of them had
them
Clarence wasn't the boss of her.
''Then she went out of the
room and Clarence-or
went in and
the box and
it in to me where
there was a broken window in the bedroom. I gave it to Clarit under an old screen
ence outside of the window and he
outside the house. Then we went back to the
sat down on the
'' Jimmie testified then that
Mr. and Mrs.
about their property,
or
and
when defendant went outside and the
small boy,
started to follow
that Mrs. Simpson
followed the defendant and
outside; that Clarence and
he also went out to the
He stated that "Just before
Mr.
started to go out he called Clarence and I out
and told us we would have to do it that
He didn't give
us any reason except she was
to get us if we didn't
get her, we would have to do it that night. Then he took the
two boys and went down to the U.C.Lf','-L"'~''-"·
"He went to the ""''"''")'JL
name of Bill-Bill Parker, I think,
Clarence and I followed him down. ·when we
there
Clarence said something about, 'Do we have to do it now.' or
something. Mr. Simpson was talking to Bill, \Ye couldn't hear
the conversation. . . . I don't remember the exact words he
said. All I heard was 'do it now.' And Mr.
when he
was through
to
went back up to the house,
then he went in. '\Ve followed him in. 'l'hen
startedthen the
started over Gary . . . . Then after
were out on the
Clarence and I followed them out ....
Mr.
started to go outside;
went to follow him.
Mrs.
him, said he could
with her, and
Mr. Simpson said if he wanted to go with him, if
wanted
to go with him, to let him come. Then Mrs. Simpson said
'No, he could
away from Mrs.
Simpson, was
to go with Mr.
so I took him
out in the kitchen to get a drink. Mr. Simpson went outside,
Gary followed him out. Mrs. Simpson went out to get Gary
and she took abold of one arm of Gary and Mr. Simpson had
the other; they were having a tug of war over
I looked

SrMPSO!'r

C.2d

towards the truck so I turned
gun out. It
he said he couldn't
it came
I took ahold of the cloth and he took the gun and run
up the
There was a cloth
around
the gun. Then he run
there
the clothesline and I
the ashecms. :l\Irs.
walked
west
of the
looked around. I looked over at Clarence
in time to see
I seen him raise it to
him raise the gun and fire. . . .
his shoulder and aim and he fired. l\Trs.
tnrm~d a
little bit and
I'm
to di(~.'
vV ent over to the east
of the
and
Clarence and I run up there. Clarence tossed the gun up
the house and Mr. Simpson came over and bent down
\Vhcn
over Mrs. Simpson to feel of her face or
he stood up, Clarence
'Is she dead Did it \York ' He
said, 'I'm afraid so, son, I'm afraid so.' ... Then Mr. Simpson says, 'You tripped over that stake there, didn't you Clarence?' He said, 'Yes.' He said, 'vVell, stick to that,' he said.
'Did you eject the cartridge?' Clarence said, 'Yes.' He said,
'vVhat did you do that for?' He said, 'I don't know.' Mr.
Simpson said, 'Oh, well, it's all right now,' lw said, 'you stick
to the story. They can't do anything to yon. Be sure to put
on a good sob story, and leave me out of it.' Then he went
over to the neighbor's. While he was gmw Clarence and 1
went out, walked around looking for the shell. \Ve couldn't.
find it, so we went over and told ... I told Clarence if we
were going to stick to that story, he had to put his foot up
against the horseshoe peg. After we got through doing· that we
came back. The neighbor came back with Mr. Simpson .... "
He also testified that after the of-ficers 1Hl.d
thPm.
were to stick to their
Mr. Simpson told them that
that they were aJl in it together, "that if one of ns said an;,cthing, we were just wringing our own neck. So he said stick to
that story, they couldn't prove anything.'' On vigorous crossexamination, he testified to substantially the same convenmtions having taken place.
CrJARENcE's TERTIMONY
Clarence Simpson, defendant's son, tcstifird in suhstfmtially the same vein as ,Jimmie ,} ones up until the point wlwre
he is supposed to have asked if he was "to do it now." His
testimony at the trial was that ;Jimmie said to him "We hettrr
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go
" that he couldn't
it out of the truck, but
,Jimmie did and handed it to him saying ''Go ahead and use
it"; that he then walked a ways and shot his mother because
rid of my little brother and ,Jimmie told
to
" Clarence then testified that ,Jimmie
I lost my
that "you better say you stumbled over the stake."
while
association with ,Jimmie and his
father at the times
to by ,Jimmie, denied that there
had been any
of any kind made to kill his mother. He admitted
the gun and hiding it in the half finiRhed house
belonging to a neighbor. He testified that he told ,Jimmie that
he didn't think the officers would believe the story they had
told and that ,Jimmie said, "Well, we better tell that your Dad
put us up to it, we had this all planned up, that we was going
to go fishing on Sunday and on Saturday we was going to
hold the gun and fool around with the gun in the house and
make it look like an accident, then we could say that my Dad
just put it off and told us to do it that night."
A statement made by Clarence on March 12, 1953, in the
district attorney's office was admitted for the purpose of impeaching testimony given by him at the trial. In that statement, Clarence said that he and his father had been planning
the "accident" for two weeks; that his dad had wanted the
boys to do it and that he, defendant, did not want to be around
>Yhen it was done. He also stated that on 'l'uesday night. the
defendant had said that maybe they ought to "do it tonig·ht,
get it over with." In his statement, Clarence said that his
mother was going to kill him and that he shot her in selfdefense and also that he had shot her accidentally because he
had stumbled; that it was not self-defense and that he had not
stumbled. He also stated that for over a month his father
had been telling him that his mother would have to be killed
before she killed Clarence; that the plans were all made, but
that he waRn 't going to go through with it.
DEPENDANT'S TESTIMONY

Defenclant denied having made any planE; with either his
son or Jimmie Jones. Concerning the occurrences on the nigllt
of the killing, he testified that his wife was having an argument with Jimmie when he came home and that the argument
then turned into abuse of him, the defendant; that he went to
Mr. Parker's home and tried to get him to go home with him;
that Clarence and ,Timmie eame running after him; that
,Jimmie said Mrs. Simpson was after l1im with a gun. He
then testified that he and the two boys went back to the
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home where an
was dark; that he heard a shot and his
I'm
' ; that he couldn't see; that he didn't
own knowledge who fired the shot; that Jimmie
him that ''the gun went off "'"'clL'""""u·
over that horseshoe
' ; that he
and told them
bors
testified that after the officers
he went to :Mr. Johnson
OTHER TESTIMONY

Officer McDaniels testified that
the
1953, he went to the
home where
less body of Vivian
He testified that Clarence told
him that he had
over a peg and
that defendant had told him either that the
the stake or that the
had told him (
tripped.
Johnson, brother of the deceased Vivian
testified
that on the night of the
defendant came to his home
and said he had some ''sad news''; that ''
shot Vivian
while he was cleaning the gun to go fishing"; that she was
"pretty bad hurt" but professed not to know what hospital
she was in; that the man with defendant (identified later as
Mr. Bishop) told him she was in a funeral
On the morning after the murder, a Jl.frs.
Coldwell
called at the Simpson home to offer to take care of the children. She testified that the defendant told her that he didn't
know why the boys had to go out and
wasn't there; that his wife had been
while the boys were in the room
when it went off.
CoRROBORATioN' OF JIMMIE .JoNEs' TEsTniWNY

Defendant contends that the
by Jimmie
,Jones is inherently improbable and that it was not corroborated by other evidence
to connect the defendant
with the crime. (Pen. Code,§ 1111.)
[1, 2] In answer to defendant's contention that Jimmie
Jones' testimony was inherently
the rule is well
settled that to warrant the
of the statements given
by a witness who has been believed by a
or trial court,
there must exist either a physical
that
are
true, or their falsity mnst be
without
to
inferences or deductions (People v. Huston, 21 Cal.2c1 690,
693 [J34 P.2d 758]), and it is the exclusive province of the
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that

disclose ''unusual
602,

that
which he

[5]

commission of the crime in such a way
that the accomplice is telling
40 Ca1.2d
156 [252 P.2d
pp.
P.2d 249] ;
Cal.2d 814, 822 [264 P.2d 547]).
Proof of the elements of the
as contrasted with
of the connection of defendant with the commission
the uncorroborated testimony of an
25 Cal.2d 862, 876, 877 [156
V.

Kll'r£'11111

Mrs.
Christian, a neighbor of the Simpson family,
testified that about a year prior to the murder, she, her husand Mr. Simpson l1ad taken a trip to Atwater in the
Christian car; that on that trip, defendant sho·wcd her a gun
he was
and said that he would have to get rid of
his wife and that ''It's
to be an accident.'' Mrs. Christian testified that on Monday
March 9, the defendant
told her that "Clarence 1vould have to kill her [Vivian]
because she wns not supposed to live any more, he couldn't
>vith her"; and tl1at he told her if "yon hear 'Pop,'
you don't know
about it.''
Bill
husband of Mary, confirmed his wife's testimony concerning the Atwater trip and testified that defendant said then that his wife had to be killed and that Clarence
would kill her. He also testified concerning the hiding of the
gun in the house he was rebuilding and stated that when Clarence, ,Jimmie, and the defendant came back to where the gun
was hidden, defendant said to him "Bill, we're going to have
to kill that woman,'' and ''Clarence is going to have to kill
her."
Donald Dodge, the 16-year-old son of the deceased woman,
testified concerning the quarrels between defendant and his
wife and also concerning various threats made by defendant
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to deceased. He stated that defendant had told
time
to the killing, that he was
to
gate off the cattle truck on her and make it look like an accident; that defendant said to Vivian ''I'm
to kill you
and make it look like an accident. I'll have Clarence do it.''
[6] False and contradictory statements of a defendant
in relation to the charge are themselvefl corroborative evidence
(People v.
70 Cal.App.
244
P.
; People
v.
ante, pp.
327 [273 P.2d
). Defendant
made various contradictory statements : that Clarence had
stumbled over a stake and accidentally shot his mother; that
he didn't know which one of the boys shot the gun; that Clarence shot his mother accidentally while
the gun
preparatory to going on a fishing trip. Mrs. Coldwell testified that defendant told her that Mrs. Simpson had been
standing at the sink, with her back to the boys, and that the
gun went off accidentally while it was being cleaned.
[7] The evidence just set forth is sufficient to connect
the defendant with the crime in such a way as reasonably may
satisfy a jury that the accomplice is telling the truth. It is
not necessary that the accomplice be corroborated as to every
fact to which he testified. (People v. Barclay, supra.)
[8] Briefly summarized, the corroborative evidence considered together with the facts heretofore set forth, shows that
during the marital life of the parties, defendant had abused
his wife, had threatened to kill her, and, for more than a year
prior to the killing, had planned to have Clarence commit
the crime and make it look like an accident. For this reason,
the cases of People v. Petree, 109 Cal.App.2d 184 [240 P.2d
327], (see People v. Jordan, 115 Cal.App.2d 452 [252 P.2d
328] ) and People v. Lima, 25 Cal.2d 573 [154 P .2d 698],
relied upon by defendant, are not in point. Defendant relies
upon the rule set forth in those cases that if the corroborative
evidence raises only a suspicion of guilt it is not sufficient
under section 1111 of the Penal Code. The rule as stated by
defendant is correct, but the corroborative evidence heretofore set forth does more than raise a suspicion of guilt on the
part of defendant and is ample to connect him with the crime
and satisfy the jury that the accomplice told the truth.
INSTRUCTION ON REASONABLE DOUBT

It is contended by defendant that the following instruction,
given at the request of the People, had the effect of placing
upon defendant the burden of proving his innocence and re-
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his guilt, and
should not find the defendant
of any offense unless his guilt is established by the
evidence to a moral
and beyond all reasonable doubt,
and the burden is on the
to establish such guilt.
'' 'rhe
presumes every man innocent until his guilt is
established to a moral
and beyond all reasonable
this
attaches at every stage of the
case, and to every fact essential to a conviction.
"Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: 'It is not a mere
doubt; because everything relating to human affairs
and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or
imaginary doubt.' It is that state of the case, which, after
the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence,
leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot
say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of
the truth of the charge.
"\¥hile presumptions of Jaw, independent of evidence, are
in favor of innocence, and every man is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, yet if the evidence establishes the
truth of the charge to a reasonable moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are to act conscienit is your duty to find the defendant guilty.
tiously upon
The law does not require demonstration or that degree of proof
which excludes all possibility of error and produces absolute
certainty. Such proof is rarely available. Moral certainty
only is required or that degree of proof which produces convictim1 in an unprejudiced mind.
''The term 'reasonable doubt,' as used in these instructions,
means a doubt ·which has some good reason* for its existence
arising out of evidence in the case* ; such doubt as you are able
to find a reason for in the evidence.* As applied to the eviflence in criminal cases, it means an actual and substantt"al
doubt growing out of the u.nsatisfactory natnre of the evidence* in the case. It does not mean a doubt which arises
from some mere whim or vagary or from any groundless surmise, suspicion or guess.''
[9] ·while the court was not restricted to the reading of
section 1096 of the Penal Code defining reasonable doubt (see
People v. Derenzo, 46 Cal.App.2d 411, 416 [115 P.2d 858];
*The emphasized portions are those concerning which complaint is
made.
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been
scribed

emphasized
PREJUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OF DISTRICT ATTORXEY

It appears from the record that defendant consulted Mr.

who
the case
Pierson, the deputy district
for the People, on June 14,
relative to a divorce from his
wife, Vivian. The divorce
was never tried since the
couple were reconciled in October. Prior to the
in August, defendant secured another
him.
It is contended by defendant that from the
representation, Mr. Pierson gained superior
of his affairs with
his wife, Vivian, and that the prejudice
to him from
this superior knowledge was demonstrated
JI.Ir. Pierson's cross-examination. Defendant cites several
of this cross-examination but does not show how it could have
resulted to his prejudice. [11] An illustration concerns
certain letters defendant introduced in evidence. These letters were four of apparently a number of letters written to him
by Vivian at one time when she had left him and were introduced to show that she was reconciled with him and that they
could live together harmonously. 1\'Ir. Pierson asked defendant why he had
four of
letters and defendant
contends that the question
that Mr. Pierson knew of
other letters of a different tenor. In answer to Pierson's
question, the defendant replied that Pierson had advised him
that the four were all that would be needed for evidence. It
is contended that this answer "reinforced" the unfavorable
inference. In support of his
that the district
occupied u"""'"'"
tine v. Stewart, 15
387, Wntch1nnna Water Co. v. Bailey,
216 Cal. 564 [15 P.2d 505], and Pennix v.
61 CaJ.App.
2d 761 [143 P.2d 940, 145 P.2d
In the Valentine case,
the attorney had represented the
in a land claim
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so
on the opposite
the
use confidential
and information
virtue of that former
In the Pennix case, an action for personal inshowed that
was involved. The defendant's
he had formed an intent to act
in the interest of deeven to the extent of accusing
fUacu>-cu>- of
in collusion with
the intent to defraud the insurance company. It was held
that
error had occurred and the case was reversed.
In
61 Cal. 128, the attorney who drew the
indictment for the
charge, represented the defendant
at the triaL 'l'he court held that there could not be such an
assumption of inconsistent positions.
It would appear that the cases cited by defendant are not
similar to the situation under consideration. Here, Mr.
Pierson had
defendant briefly in a divorce action
which did not come to trial but was dismissed, and defendant
had
other counsel for another divorce action prior
to the time at hand; that action, too, was dismissed. It should
also be noted that no objection was made by defense counsel
at the time the matter was made known in the trial of the
case at bar. Neither was objection made at that time that it
was Mr. Pierson's "superior knowledge" that prompted him
to question defendant concerning the other letters which had
not been introduced in evidence by the defendant.
[12] It is also argued that on another occasion, Mr. Pierson challenged the veracity of the defendant and stated that
"If he [defendant J keeps it up, I'm going to have to take
the stand." The transcript shows that during Mr. Pierson's
cross-examination of defendant concerning the size of a book
with which defendant stated his wife had struck Clarence,
defendant would only gesture and ·would refuse to give an
answer
that "Yon [Mr. Pierson) have seen it." Mr.
Pierson, during a heated exchange between himself, defense
counsel, and the court, stated: "In these answers Mr. Simpson
is giving, I don't know whether he wants me to take the stand
and answer these statements he is making about me or not.
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If he
it up, I'm
" It
does not appear that the
questhe
of the
endeavoring to make a point for the record; that defendant did not
understand what was expected of him; that Mr. Pierson meant
that he would have to take the stand to
as to the size
of the book.
[13] Another alleged
suffered
defendant
cnrred when Pierson
to recall to defendant's son
Billy's mind whether he had ever heard his father say anything "bad" about his mother. During the recross-examination, Mr. Pierson asked Billy if he remembered
around
when his father talked to him (Pierson) and Billy replied that
he did not-that he only remembered going to Mr. Pierson's
office once.
Defendant's argument that the deputy district attorney
stated to the jury that he had ''checked'' on defendant's
story and that he, Mr. Pierson, had not been "mesmerized"
by defendant, is not borne out by the record. It is apparent
that it was defendant who had done the ''checking'' and that
the statement concerning ''mesmerized'' was a quotation from
defense counsel's argument to the jury: '' 'Do you think,'
says Mr. Friedman, 'that he mesmerized Mr. Pierson?'"
There was no assignment of prejudicial misconduct by defense
counsel and, furthermore, it is difficult to see how such remarks could have prejudiced the defendant.
[14] Still another contention that the district attorney
was guilty of prejudicial misconduct is the allegation that
"two pages of the transcript" were used in arguing to the
jury facts not in evidence. In particular, complaint is made
concerning the statement "She's going to kill your little
brothers'' in that there was no such testimony concerning the
child Gary. Jimmie Jones testified that defendant told him
and Clarence, on several occasions, that "if we didn't get her
she was going to get us"; defendant himself told one Eldon
Marxmiller, a witness for the People, that "I am going to
get rid of her or she is going to get rid of me and the boys'' ;
Clarence testified that one of the reasons why he shot his
mother was because ''she was going to get rid of my little
brother." It would appear that the evidence justifiably permitted the inference that the use of the word "boys" meant
all of them, including Gary.
[15] Another allegation of prejudicial misconduct on the
part of the district attorney was the following portion of his
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action.
you
any
any more, you
she's
to take it away.
take it away.
to use him for the au"'~''""·'
want
She's
she
this divorce
misconduct by Mr.
CouRT: I
Mr.
ting in an inference there. I'm
sure that .,,.,,l'"t.hi
you said, Mr.
say to the little boys, it
evidence.
Your
"MR. PIERSON: I'll withdraw my statement
Honor, if there is any
about that, I'll withdraw it
and ask that the .jury
because I cerdon 't want to put
isn't
there.''
The court thereupon au=u•.uE,uvu the
statement made
Mr.
to the same
was also
There is no direct testimony in the record concerning the
the
There
statement
to Mr. Simpson
he asked his
however, testimony
what
was
later he and
his
that
later
and had taken a
or
the
was afraid
mother would
some of
his father
previously told him that
the papers and
she had taken some and hidden
Donald Dodge tes1t:tn<:\U
that
and Vivian often quarreled about the custoay
upon
; that Vivian wanted Gary
of the
but that defendant did not agree ;
couple ""''""""'
home property. Other evidence
that
on several occasions, pointed out to
that if he didn't get his mother she would get him.
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and it is a matter \Ylthin
whei her eonnscl
raugc of (lisens~ion.
318 [12;) P.2d 29j.)" The trial court

"

to statements admitted
purposes as affirmatiYe cYidenec i11 the case.
'l'his contention is not
tbe reeord which shows
that the
evidence 1ms eomrasted to the testimony
the witnesses when on the stand. Purthermore,
there was no assignment of prejudicial misconduct at the
time. Iicferences to the "malevolent P')Wcr" of Mr. Simpson
over Clarence which forced Clarence to "parrot the fanciful
stories that l\Ir. Simpson had
in his mind" were not
objected to at the time
·were made and no
is now
made that defendant could haYe been prejudiced thereby.
[17] It is contended that a statement by the
district attorney that when Me. Walters first heard about the
death of l\irs. Simpson, he went to the sheriff's office to inform
them, was a misstatement of the evidence. l\lr. Jjlriedman
stated that l\T r. \V alters' testimony \Yas that he had been sent
for by the sheriff. Mr. Pierson replied that he did not recall
the exact testimony and upon the court's question "Did he
want to argue about it~" 1\Ir. Pierson
"I knmv the
facts on it but I don't recall what the
\Yas." 'l'he
court then asked if he wished to concede the point and let it
go, to which Pierson
that he would not make an issue
of the question. There was no assignment of prejm1ieinl misconduct and no sho·wing of prejudice since this partien1ar matter was quite immaterial concerning the
or innoeencc
of the defendant. The eases cited by defendant (People Y.
Kirkes, 39 Cal.2d 719, 724 [249 P.2d 1]; People v. Evans, 39
Cal.2d 242 [246 P.2d 6:36]; People v. Brophlf, 122 Cal.App.2d
638, 651 f265 P.2d 593] ; People v. Ford, 89 Ca1.App.2d 467,
470 [200 P.2d 867]; People v. Cook. 148 Cal. :134 [8:1 P. 34])
are not in point. In the Kirkes ease, the c1istrirt attorney
stated that he knew the defendant was guilty; in the Evans
case, reference was made to a knife carried by the ehil d's at-
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jury
heetl

erime of theft of
!:ad been
The fads had sbovvn that dd'emlant
a fnrnitnre movfurniiure from tlw home of
In
had lwen
the
that
but
of the
an erroneous instruetion 1vas eonfor reversal.
In
v.
snpm, 148 Ual
the pt·oseeution
argued to the
that the defendant had srnt one man to
prison beeause he
to his daughter and the defendant ·was therefore
and eH
of killing upon the
same ineltement. There was no evidenee of m1y kind pertaining to the alleged statement; the eourt refused to so instruet
i he
and thr a
c:onrt reyersed.
In all of the eases relied upon by deffmdant, the damaging
nature of the
is at once apparent.
[18] Drfendant's last contention is that the evidence doel':
not justify the verdict. It is defendant's argnment that siuee
he did not fire the fatal, or any, shot and yet reeeiwd the rleatJ1
penalty, the record should be scrutinized
this eourt with
even
care.
the evidence most fayorably in
support of the judgment as ·we are bmm!l to
we feel that
thene is no merit to defendant's contrntion.

Gibson, r.
Shenk, J., Rdmonch;, J., 'I'raynor, .J., Sehauer .
.T.. and Sprnee, .J., eoneurrecl.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied November
24, 1954.

